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ABSTRACT 
Elliptic curve cryptography plays a crucial role in network and communica t ion 
security. However, implementation of elliptic curve cryptography, especially the 
implementation of scalar multiplication on an elliptic curve, faces multiple challenges. One 
of the main challenges is side channel attacks (SCAs). SCAs pose a real threat to the 
conventional implementations of scalar multiplication such as binary methods (also called 
doubling-and-add methods). Several scalar multiplication algorithms with 
countermeasures against side channel attacks have been proposed. Among them, 
Montgomery Powering Ladder (MPL) has been shown an effective countermeasure against 
simple power analysis. However, MPL is still vulnerable to certain more sophisticated side 
channel attacks. A recently proposed modified MPL utilizes a combination of sequence 
masking (SM), exponent splitting (ES) and point randomization (PR). And it has shown to 
be one of the best countermeasure algorithms that are immune to many sophisticated side 
channel attacks [11]. In this thesis, an efficient hardware architecture for this algorithm is 
proposed and its FPGA implementation is also presented. To our best knowledge, this is 
the first time that this modified MPL with SM, ES, and PR has been implemented in 
hardware. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
The Internet is increasingly important to the people all over the world who use it 
for personal and business purposes. While the internet brings much convenience to people, 
there still exist security risks and vulnerabilities in using the internet. For example, various 
cyber-attacks, including side channel attacks, pose a great danger for the Internet users. 
Network security, which provides physical and software countermeasures to protect the 
network from unauthorized access and attacks, becomes a very active research area and 
industry. Cryptography plays a critical role in providing essential and unique network 
security services to the internet.  
There are two main families of cryptography from the point of view of key 
generation, symmetric-key cryptography and asymmetric-key cryptography. In symmetr ic-
key cryptography system, there is only one key used both for encryption and decryption. 
This system requires that both parties involved in the communication share one secret key, 
which has to be pre-arranged in advance in a procedure called key establishment. This is 
regarded as a main drawback of symmetric-key cryptography system since it cannot 
resolve the issue of key establishment without resorting to a third party. 
Unlike symmetric-key cryptography system, the asymmetric-key cryptography 
system (more popularly known as public-key system) uses two keys, one for encryption 
and the other for decryption. The key used for encryption is the public key, which is 
accessible to the public and can be distributed widely and easily. The other one used for 
decryption is the private key, which must be kept secret and is only known to the owner of 
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the cryptosystem. By differentiating the encryption key and decryption key, the 
asymmetric-cryptography system can provide very important and unique security services 
such like key exchange and digital signature. A drawback of asymmetric-cryptography 
systems is that they have higher computational complexity, compared to symmetrical key 
systems. 
 Since Diffie and Hellman proposed the Diffie-Hellman key exchange scheme as 
the first asymmetric-cryptography system in 1976 [3], several asymmetric-key 
cryptography systems have been presented, such like RSA, ElGamel, and Elliptic curve 
cryptography. All these algorithms are based on some different hard mathematica l 
problems. Based on their underlying mathematical problems, these algorithms can be 
classified as follows. 
 
Table 1.1 Public key systems and the hard math problems 
 The security strength of the cryptosystem relies on the fact it is hard to solve these 
mathematical problems. The Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC), first proposed by Miller 
and Koblitz in 1985 [1], [2], can provide higher security strength per bit compared to other 
asymmetric-cryptography system such like RSA. This is because elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm problem (ECDLP) is much harder to solve than factorization of a product of two 
large primes.  
Public key system Hard Math Problems 
RSA Integer factorization 
ElGamal Discrete logarithm problem  
Elliptic curve cryptosystem Elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem 
 3 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.2 A comparison of key sizes 
The large RSA key size requires long computation time and large VLSI area when 
implemented in hardware. While ECC is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem, the security of ECC relies on the difficulty of elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem. ECC can provide same level security strength as RSA with much shorter keys. 
Table 1.2 shows a comparison of key sizes needed to achieve equivalent level of security 
strength. This feature of ECC makes it very suitable for smart cards, credit cards, pagers, 
PDAs and mobile phones [4]. 
Other than solving the difficult ECDLP to break ECC mathematically, attackers 
can take advantage of the physical implementation and retrieve secret parameters by 
observing the information leaked during the computation. This method is referred to as 
Side Channel Attacks (SCA) and discussed in [5], [6]. Scalar multiplication, which 
multiplies a point on an elliptic curve by a scalar, is the main computation involved in ECC. 
Unguarded scalar multiplication algorithms are vulnerable to SCAs. In order to protect 
Security Level (bits) RSA Key Size (bits) ECC Key Size (bits) 
80 1024 160 
112 2048 224 
128 3072 256 
192 7680 384 
256 15360 512 
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ECC from SCA, the computation steps involved in the scalar multiplication algorithms 
have to be regular so that less useful side channel information can be leaked to attackers. 
There have been several existing algorithms for computing the scalar multiplication. A 
classical algorithm is the binary algorithm or doubling-and-add., it can be easily cracked 
by Simple Power Analysis (SPA) since it may consume different power in each iteration, 
depending on binary bit of the scalar. To withstand SPA, a double and add always 
algorithm is proposed by Coron in 1999 [7]. The idea is to add a dummy operation to make 
every iteration consume same power, thus the computation is regular in each step. However, 
this algorithm still remains insecure against a doubling attack proposed by Fouque in 2003 
[8]. To provide further protection against various SCAs, Montgomery Powering Ladder 
(MPL) is invented by Marc Joye and Sung-Ming Yen in 2003 [9]. Although MPL is highly 
regular and efficient compared to the classical algorithms, it is still subject to SCAs such 
like Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Introduced by Kocher in 1999 [10], Differentia l 
Power Analysis focus on capturing the power consumption of the target device and by 
analyzing the power consumption to get information of the secret key. Another Modified 
Montgomery Power Ladder algorithm proposed by He in [11] can provide protection to 
more SCAs than the regular MPL. To the best of our knowledge, scalar multiplica t ion 
based on this algorithm has not yet been implemented. Thus an efficient implementa t ion 
of ECC, which can resist more SCAs is needed for modern cryptographic applications. 
 
1.2 A Summary of Contributions 
In this thesis we propose an efficient hardware architecture for the modified MPL 
with sequence masking (SM), exponent splitting (ES) and point randomization (PR) 
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algorithm [11]. More specifically we 
 Proposed an efficient hardware architecture for the modified MPL with SM, 
ES and PR algorithm [11]. 
 Presented a FPGA implementation for the modified MPL with SM, ES and 
PR algorithm [11], which is the first time in literature. 
1.3 Thesis Organization 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter II provided mathematica l 
background in finite field and elliptic curve which are important for understanding the 
proposed work. The concept of SCA is introduced and then many types of SCAs are 
reviewed in Chapter III. In Chapter IV an overview of existing related works is given. 
Chapter V provides a detailed discussion on a modified MPL with SM, ES and PR. Chapter 
VI proposes an efficient hardware architecture for the modified MPL with SM, ES and PR. 
FPGA implementation of the proposed architecture is also presented and the FPGA results 
are analyzed and discussed. Conclusive remarks are given and possible future works are 
commented in Chapter VII. 
 6 
CHAPTER II 
MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter introduces the related mathematical background of the ECC based 
systems. Definition of finite field and elliptic curve are given. Arithmetic over finite field, 
point operations over elliptic curve is also curved. Finally, some ECC scheme is introduced. 
2.1 Finite Field 
Finite field, also known as Galois Field (GF), is proposed by Galois in 1832. Galois 
Theory emphasis a relation between groups and fields. Finite field was introduced as an 
example of a field. A finite field is a finite set of numbers in which addition and 
multiplication are defined. It is an additive group under the addition operation. All the 
nonzero elements in a finite field form a multiplicative group under multiplica t ion 
operation. Primitive element is the generator of the multiplicative group. For a finite field 
𝐹, if n is the smallest integer satisfying that 𝑛𝑎 = 0 for every field element a in the finite 
field 𝐹, then n is the characteristic of 𝐹. 
Prime finite field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) consists of elements {0,1,2… 𝑝− 1}, where p is a prime 
number. Arithmetic in 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) can be described as follows. Addition is defined as modulo-
𝑝 addition. Multiplication is defined as modulo-𝑝 multiplication. 𝑝 is the characteristic of 
𝐺𝐹(𝑝). 
Extension finite field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝𝑚), where p is a prime and m is a positive integer greater 
than 1, the elements of 𝐺𝐹(𝑝𝑚) are polynomials of degree up to 𝑚− 1 with coefficients 
belonging to 𝐺𝐹(𝑝),  
𝐺𝐹(𝑝𝑚) = {𝑎𝑚−1𝑥
𝑚−1 + 𝑎𝑚−2𝑥
𝑚−2 + ⋯+ 𝑎2𝑥
2 +𝑎1𝑥 + 𝑎0} 
where 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝐹(2), irreducible polynomial is 𝑓(𝑥). 𝑝 is a prime and m is a positive integer 
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greater than 1, the elements of 𝐺𝐹(𝑝𝑚) are polynomials of degree up to 𝑚− 1 with 
coefficients belonging to 𝐺𝐹(𝑝). The irreducible polynomial 𝑓(𝑥) cannot be factored into 
product of polynomials that has degree less than m.  
 Binary Extension finite field 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚)  is a special case of 𝐺𝐹(𝑝𝑚) , where is 
consists of 2𝑚 elements and its characteristic is 2.  
𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) = {𝑎𝑚−1𝑥
𝑚−1 + 𝑎𝑚−2𝑥
𝑚−2 + ⋯+ 𝑎2𝑥
2 + 𝑎1𝑥 + 𝑎0}, 
where 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝐹(2) , irreducible polynomial is 𝑓(𝑥) . Elements in this field can be 
represented as (𝑚 − 1) degree polynomial, for example if 𝐴 is an element in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚), 𝐴 
can be represented as  
𝐴 = 𝑎𝑚−1𝑥
𝑚−1 +𝑎𝑚−2𝑥
𝑚−2 +⋯+𝑎2𝑥
2 +𝑎1𝑥 + 𝑎0, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑎𝑖 ∈ 𝐺𝐹(2)  
It can also be represented as an m bits binary string (𝑎𝑚−1, 𝑎𝑚−2 ,…, 𝑎1, 𝑎0), where 𝑎𝑖 ∈
𝐺𝐹(2) . This representation is defined as the polynomial basis representation. This 
representation is beneficial in hardware implementation since its operations like addition 
and multiplication can be realized using AND logic gate and XOR logic gate. The additio n 
operation over binary extension field is modulo 2 addition. The multiplication is modulo 
𝑓(𝑥), modulo 2 multiplication. 
2.2 Elliptic Curve over GF(2m) 
Let p be a prime number greater than 3, and coefficients 𝑎, 𝑏 in the field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝), 
then the elliptic curve E over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) is defined with equation: 
E: 𝑦2 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏 
This equation is a simplified Weierstrass equation. The points on the curve satisfy 
that both the 𝑥-coordinate and 𝑦-coordinate are both elements over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝). Assume there 
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two points 𝑃 (𝑥1,𝑦1) and 𝑄 (𝑥2,𝑦2) on the curve. The group operator point addition obeys 
the following rules. Draw a line through point 𝑃 and 𝑄, if there exists a third point 
𝑅 (𝑥3,𝑦3) which intersects with the curve. The mirror reflection of 𝑅 about the 𝑥-axis is 
defined as the addition result. If such an intersection point does not exist, we consider the 
result as infinity. The point at infinity 𝑂, defined by 𝑃+ 𝑂 = 𝑂 , exists for every ellipt ic 
curve.  The additive inverse of point 𝑃 is its reflection across the 𝑥-axis. All the points on 
curve E and the point at infinity forms a group 𝐺 defined by the point addition operator. 𝐺 
is an abelian group sine the group operator addition is commutative.  
 
                                Figure 2.1 Point addition on ECC 
If 𝑃 and 𝑄 satisfy 𝑥1 ≠ 𝑥2, then we have point addition computed using the 
following equation. 
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{
 
 𝜆 =
𝑦1 + 𝑦2
𝑥1 + 𝑥2
𝑥3 = 𝜆
2 + 𝑥1 + 𝑥2
𝑦3 = (𝑥1 + 𝑥3)𝜆+ 𝑦1
 
 If 𝑃 and 𝑄 satisfy 𝑃 = 𝑄 and 𝑦1 ≠ 0, then point doubling is defined below. 
{
 
 
 
 𝜆 =
3𝑥1
2 + 𝑎
2𝑦1
𝑥3 = 𝜆
2 + 2𝑥1
𝑦3 = (𝑥1 + 𝑥3)𝜆+ 𝑦1
 
 For an integer 𝑘, scalar multiplication 𝑘𝑃 is defined as repeated addition like  
𝑘𝑃 = 𝑃 + 𝑃 +⋯𝑃 
repeated for 𝑘 times.  
 The order n of point P is defined as the minimal integer satisfies 𝑛𝑃 = 𝑂. 
 Let a and b be elements in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) . An elliptic curve E over 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) can be 
defined by the equation 
E: 𝑦2 +𝑥𝑦 = 𝑥3 + 𝑎𝑥2 + 𝑏  
 Points over elliptic curve defined in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) have similar operations to that defined 
in 𝐺𝐹(𝑝). Consider two points 𝑃 (𝑥1,𝑦1)  and 𝑄 (𝑥2,𝑦2) on the curve, and 𝑅 (𝑥3,𝑦3) be 
the result of 𝑃 + 𝑄. If 𝑃 = 𝑄, point addition is computed as follows. 
{
 
 𝜆 =
𝑦1 + 𝑦2
𝑥1 + 𝑥2
𝑥3 = 𝜆
2 + 𝜆 + 𝑥1+ 𝑥2 +𝑎
𝑦3 = (𝑥1 + 𝑥3)𝜆 + 𝑥3 + 𝑦1
 
 If 𝑃 ≠ 𝑄, point doubling is performed as below. 
{
 
 𝜆 =
𝑦1
𝑥1
+ 𝑥1
𝑥3 = 𝜆
2 + 𝜆 + 𝑎
𝑦3 = 𝑥1
2 + 𝜆𝑥3 + 𝑥3
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All the addition, multiplication and inversion involved in there equations are finite 
field arithmetic. The most time consuming operations are finite field multiplication and 
inversion. 
2.3 Elliptic Curve 
For a given field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) and curve E over the field, it is easy to calculate 𝑘𝑃 for a 
point 𝑃 on the curve. However, if 𝑘𝑃 and 𝑃 is known, it is considered very difficult to 
calculate integer 𝑘. This is called the ECDLP problem, and the security strength of ECC 
relies on it. 
2.3.1 System Setup 
To setup a secure elliptic curve cryptography system, the parameters of the curve 
has to be chosen very carefully. The elliptic curve used in the system need to be non-
singular since singular curves are easy to crack.  
The parameters needed to construct an elliptic curve cryptography system includ ing 
the following. Finite field 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) defined by 𝑝, elliptic curve E defined by 𝑎 and 𝑏, base 
point 𝑃, the order of the base point 𝑛 and the factor ℎ. The parameter set is known to the 
public. 
If the system is over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝) , the parameter set is 𝐷 = {𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑃, 𝑛, ℎ} . The 
parameters are defined as above stated. If the cryptography system is built over 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚), 
the parameter set is 𝐷 = {𝑚, 𝑓(𝑥),𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑃, 𝑛, ℎ} where 𝑓(𝑥) is the irreducible polynomia l 
define the field. To calculate factor ℎ, first count all the points and the point at infinity to 
get the order of the elliptic curve #E, then h is #E divided by 𝑛. 
2.3.2 Generation of the key pairs 
After the system is set up, assume Bob is trying to communicate with Alice. Alice 
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will choose the keys as introduced below. 
Step 1: Choose a random integer 𝑑 ∈  [1,𝑛 − 1] 
Step 2: Computes point 𝑄 = 𝑑𝑃  
 The public key is point 𝑄, and private key is integer 𝑑. 
2.3.3 Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES) 
The most extended encryption and decryption scheme based on ECC is the Ellip t ic 
Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme (ECIES). This scheme is a variant of the ElGamal 
scheme proposed in [12]. This scheme is described as follows: 
System Setup: 
Step 1: Alice sets the ECC system parameter sets 𝐷 = {𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑃, 𝑛, ℎ} 
Step 2: Computes Key Pair (𝑄, 𝑑) 
Encryption: 
Step 1: Bob selects a random number 𝑘 ∈  [1, 𝑛 − 1] 
Step 2: Computes 𝑅 =  𝑘𝑃, and 𝑍 =  ℎ𝑘𝑄. 
Step 3: 𝑋 -coordinate of 𝑍  and 𝑅  is converted to (𝑘1,𝑘2)  using a key derivation hash 
function 
Step 4: Message m is encrypted with 𝑘1  using a symmetrical key cipher to get 𝐶 =
𝐸𝑁𝐶 (𝑚) 
Step 5: Computes 𝑡 =  𝑀𝐴𝐶 (𝐶) using 𝑘2, where 𝑀𝐴𝐶 is a message authentication code 
Step 6: Cipher text (𝑅, 𝐶, 𝑡) is sent to Alice 
Decryption:  
Step 1: Alice computes 𝑍 =  ℎ𝑑𝑅 
Step 2: 𝑋 -coordinate of 𝑍  and 𝑅  is converted to (𝑘1,𝑘2)   using a key derivation hash 
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function  
Step 3: Computes 𝑡 =  𝑀𝐴𝐶 (𝐶) using 𝑘2, where 𝑀𝐴𝐶 is a message authentication code  
Step 4: Message m is decrypted with 𝑘1  using a symmetrical key cipher to get 𝑚 =
𝐷𝐸𝐶 (𝐶) 
 This scheme works since when Alice generates 𝑍, it follows that, 
𝑍 = ℎ𝑑𝑅 = ℎ𝑑 (𝑘𝑃) = ℎ𝑘(𝑑𝑃) = ℎ𝑘𝑄  
So both the encryption and decryption generate the same key pair (𝑘1, 𝑘2).  
2.3.4 Elliptic Curve Diffie–Hellman Key Exchange (ECDHKE) 
ECDHKE is the generic key exchange scheme based on the Diffie-Hellman 
mechanism applied to elliptic curves [13]. The information available to the public is the 
elliptic curve E over 𝐺𝐹(𝑝), and a point 𝑃 with order n on the curve. The computations are 
described as follows: 
Computation of Alice: 
Step 1: Alice chooses random number 𝑎 ∈  [1, 𝑛 − 1] 
Step 2: Computes 𝑎𝑃 and it is sent to Bob  
Step 3: After receiving 𝑏𝑃 form Bob, Alice computes scalar multiplication 𝑎(𝑏𝑃) to get                   
𝑎𝑏𝑃 
Computation of Bob: 
Step 1: Bob chooses random number 𝑏 ∈  [1,𝑛 − 1] 
Step 2: Computes 𝑏𝑃 and it is sent to Alice  
Step 3: After receiving 𝑎𝑃 form Alice, Bob computes scalar multiplication 𝑏 (𝑎𝑃) to get 
𝑏𝑎𝑃 
The secret key shared by the two parties is 𝑘 =  𝑎𝑏𝑃. By applying this scheme, the 
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secret key is securely exchanged. 
2.3.5 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) 
ECDSA is the elliptic curve variant of the Digital Signature Algorithm [14]. This 
scheme can be introduced as the following steps: 
System Setup: 
Step 1: Alice sets the ECC system parameter sets 𝐷 = {𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑃, 𝑛, ℎ} 
Step 2: Computes Key Pair (𝑄, 𝑑) 
Signing of the message: 
Step 1: Alice calculates 𝑒 =  𝐻 (𝑚), where H is a hash function.  
Step 2: Chooses random number 𝑘 ∈  [1,𝑛 − 1]  
Step 3: Calculates point 𝑅 =  𝑘𝑃 (𝑥1,𝑦1).  
Step 4: Calculates 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 = 𝑥1 mod 𝑛. If 𝑠𝑖𝑔1 = 0, Alice chooses another 𝑘. 
Step 5: Calculates 𝑠𝑖𝑔2  =  𝑘
−1(𝑒 +  𝑑𝑥1) mod 𝑛. 
Step 6: The signature is the pair (𝑠𝑖𝑔1 , 𝑠𝑖𝑔2). 
Verification of the signature: 
Step 1: Bob calculates 𝑒 =  𝐻 (𝑚), where 𝐻 is a hash function.  
Step 2: Calculates 𝑤 =  𝑠𝑖𝑔2
−1  mod 𝑛. 
Step 3: Calculates 𝑢1  =  𝑒𝑤 mod 𝑛 and 𝑢2  =  𝑠𝑖𝑔1𝑤 mod 𝑛. 
Step 4: Calculates point 𝑋 =  𝑢1𝑃 +  𝑢2𝑄 and retrieve the 𝑥-coordinate of 𝑋 denoted by 
𝑥2 
Step 5: The signature is valid if 𝑠𝑖𝑔1  =  𝑥2 mod 𝑛, if not the signature is rejected. 
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To prove the correctness of the algorithm, the following equation can be performed. 
𝑋 = 𝑢1𝑃 + 𝑢2𝑄 
= 𝑢1𝑃 +  𝑢2𝑑 ×  𝑃 
= (𝑢1 + 𝑢2d) ×  P 
= (𝑒 × 𝑠𝑖𝑔2
−1  +   𝑠𝑖𝑔1 × 𝑠𝑖𝑔2
−1  𝑑) ×  𝑃 
= (𝑒 +  𝑠𝑖𝑔1𝑑)𝑠𝑖𝑔2
−1 ×  𝑃 
= (𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖𝑔1𝑑) (𝑒 + 𝑠𝑖𝑔1𝑑)
−1(𝑘−1)−1 × 𝑃 =  𝑘𝑃 
 Thus from the computation it is verified  𝑠𝑖𝑔1  =  𝑥2 mod n from point 𝑋 =  𝑘𝑃. 
From all the above algorithms, it can be seen that scalar multiplication is the main 
computation involved in elliptic curve cryptography. SCAs mainly target the scalar 
multiplication in ECC to compromise partial or the full secret key. 
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CHAPTER III 
SIDE CHANNEL ATTACKS  
To consider a cryptosystem under mathematically circumstances, a black-box 
model is usually used. In the black-box scheme, attackers cannot get any intermed iate 
computation results [15]. The only information available to the attackers are plaintext and 
cipher text. Thus in order to break the cryptosystem, the attackers need to solve the hard 
math problem such like ECDLP in ECC.  
 
Figure 3.1 Traditional cryptosystem 
However, such model is not adequate under most scenarios in practice. When a 
cryptosystem is implemented on hardware, there will be unintended information leaked 
during the execution of the algorithm. The attackers thus can try to find correlation between 
the leaked information and the secret key. Side Channel can be classified based on the types  
of side channel information. Information can be extracted from timing, power consumption 
or electromagnetic radiation features. Hardware or software faults, computational errors, 
and changes in frequency or temperature can also lead to leak of information. Table 3.1 
shows the relation between leaked information and type of side channel attacks. 
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Table 3.1 Category of SCAs 
3.1 Timing Attack 
Many of the implementations of cryptographic algorithms perform the 
computations in a non-constant time. The time variations sometimes can become a 
breakthrough point of the system. If the difference of time is correlated to the secret 
parameters, then a statistical analysis can reveal enough information to access the key. 
Timing attack was first introduced by Kocher in [5].  
The working principle of timing attack is to capitalize on the time difference, thus 
an easy countermeasure is to make the implementation on the hardware equalize the 
computation time in each step.  
3.2 Fault Attack 
The idea of fault attack is to inject a fault and force the system to leak information 
related to the secret parameter. Fault attack was first introduced in [16]. Consider a 
hardware implementation of a cryptosystem, the execution of a fault attack usually two 
steps [17]. The first step is to inject a fault and the second step is to do a cryptanalys is 
based on the erroneously result.  
Side Channel Information Side Channel Attacks 
  
Power traces 
Simple power analysis(SPA) 
Differential power analysis 
Comparative power analysis 
Time Timing attack 
Faults and error Fault attack 
Electromagnetic radiation EM attack 
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Among the many fault attacks, differential fault attack (DFA) caught most attention 
of the scientists and researchers. To initialize DFA, a bit error is enforced into the hardware 
before or during the computation. By analyzing the correct result and the erroneous result, 
the information of the secret key is compromised. Biehl and Műller proposed an effective 
DFA against ECC in 2000 [18]. The main idea is to construct a reference elliptic curve Er 
and choose a reference point 𝑃𝑟 on the Curve. By inputting this reference point into the 
tamper-proof hardware, the reference result 𝑑 × 𝑃𝑟  on the curve is 𝐸𝑟  computed. Since 
curve 𝐸𝑟 is carefully chosen that the order of the curve has a factor 𝑟 equals to the order of 
𝑃𝑟, the ECDLP is deduced to the subgroup of order 𝑟. Next another reference point is 
carefully chosen and the whole process is duplicated. The secret parameter 𝑑  can be 
revealed. 
Yen and Joye introduced another fault attack scheme in [19], this attack targets the 
algorithms with dummy operations. By carefully timing a fault injection, the attacker can 
distinguish whether this fault causes an error in the result. Thus it can be known whether a 
redundant operation is executed.  By repeating the procedure, the whole secret key can be 
retrieved. This attack is called safe-error attack. 
3.3 Electromagnetic Attack 
Electromagnetic (EM) attack [20] is based on the fact that all electrical device 
radiates electromagnetic waves when operating. An adversary examines the changes of the 
electromagnetic field first and then an electromagnetic analysis is executed trying to extract 
the secret information. 
Wu and Yu introduced an EM attack against scalar multiplication in [21]. The 
attacker is targeting a classical binary algorithm. The electromagnetic traces captured have 
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significant difference when different computation is executed. Thus it is easy to access the 
secret key by comparing the power traces. 
3.4 Power Analysis Attack 
Similar to EM attacks, power consumption is often leaked during the running 
process of the cryptographic device. By observing the power traces, attackers can get 
access to the information on where a certain operation happened and what secret parameter 
is involved. Since power analysis attacks usually use little resources, power constrained 
applications such like smart cards are primary targets of it [22]. 
Power analysis attack can be generally categorized into two types, simple power 
analysis (SPA) and differential power analysis (DPA). SPA attacker examines the power 
traces of cryptography computations and distinguish the power consumption caused by the 
secret key. The attacker tries to get secret information by observation of repetitive patterns 
in the obtained power traces. If power consumptions are distinguishable the information of 
secret key is leaked. DPA relies on the statistical analysis to reveal the correlation between 
the secret bit and power consumption. It is usually executed in two steps. First the power 
traces are captured, then analysis regarding the captured information is carried out. Among 
all the various SCAs, DPA is being regarded as one of the strongest. The difference lies in 
that despite merely observation of the power spectrum, DPAs employ more statistica l 
methods to guess the secret key.  
Coron shows in [7] how DPAs work against scalar multiplication, which is the main 
computation in ECC. Since in many scalar multiplication algorithms, the result is computed 
by continuous point addition chain. That is, given a point 𝑃 and scalar 𝑑, 𝑑𝑃 is calculated 
as: 
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𝑃 → 𝑑0𝑃 → 𝑑1𝑃 → 𝑑2𝑃 → 𝑑3𝑃 → ⋯ → 𝑑𝑃 
The attacker starts guessing from 𝑑0 = 1 to 𝑑. For each 𝑑𝑖, a set 𝐴𝑖 with all possible 𝑑𝑖 =
 𝑑𝑗 + 𝑑𝑘  where 0 ≤  𝑗 ≤ 𝑘 <  𝑖 is built. For each element 𝑑𝑖 in the set 𝐴𝑖, the correlation 
of power consumption and 𝑑𝑖𝑃 is computed. When the peak is achieved in the computation, 
the desired 𝑑𝑖  is recovered. By repeating the same pattern for 𝑑0 = 1 to 𝑑, the secret key 
𝑑 will be compromised at last. 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXISTING WORK REVIEW AND SECURITY ANALYSIS  
There have been different scalar multiplication algorithms existing to improve the 
overall performance for efficient or security. In this chapter we introduce the different 
algorithms and their implementations. Also the security strength of these algorithms will 
be analyzed. 
4.1 Classical binary algorithm 
 The binary algorithm is also known as the “square and multiply method” to do 
exponentiation calculation. It is a very old algorithm which has over 2000 year’s history 
[23].   While in the scalar multiplication scenario, it is very simply adapted as the double 
and add algorithm.  
 The basic idea of double and add algorithm is to make full use of the binary form 
of the scalar. Consider a point 𝑃 and scalar 𝑘, rather than add point 𝑃 to itself 𝑑 times to 
get the result 𝑘𝑃, the double and add method will obviously reduce number of addition 
operation needed.   
 The binary algorithm has two versions, one is from the least significant bit to the 
most significant bit shown in Algorithm 4.1.  
Algorithm 4.1.Right to left version of double-and-add method 
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1, 𝑘0)2 ,𝑘𝑖𝜖 0,1 
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸 
Step 1: 𝑥 = 𝑂, 𝑦 = 𝑃; 
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=0 𝑡𝑜 𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜 
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Step 3:    𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝑦 
Step 4:    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 5:𝑦 = 2𝑦 
Step 6:𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Step 7:𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥 
  
The other is calculating from the most significant bit to the least significant bit, as 
shown in algorithm 4.2. 
Algorithm 4.2.Left to right version of double-and-add method 
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1, 𝑘0)2 ,𝑘𝑖𝜖 0,1 
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸 
Step 1: 𝑥 = 𝑃; 
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−2 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜 
Step 3:     𝑥 = 2𝑥 
Step 4:     𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝑃 
Step 5:     𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 6: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Step 7: 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥 
 
Although the addition operation is significantly reduced in the double-and-add 
algorithm, the drawbacks of this algorithm is crucial. Comparing the operations carried out 
when the secret bit 𝑘𝑖  is different, it is clear that more computations are executed when 
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𝑘𝑖  = 1. In every iteration, the doubling operation is always performed, while addition only 
happens when 𝑘𝑖  = 1. This variation responses directly into the power consumption.  As 
shown in Figure 4.1, D denotes doubling operation and A represents addition operation. 
The secret bit is chosen as 𝑘 =  (0101)2. The length of the power peak is different, thus 
the attacker can observe the power traces and distinguish the secret bits. This figure shows 
exactly how the double-and-add algorithm is vulnerable to the SPA attack. Because of this 
major drawback, many other algorithms is have been developed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 Vulnerability of binary method to SPA 
A high speed ECC processor is implemented by Hossain and Kong in 2015 [24]. 
Over field 𝐺𝐹(2233), their ECC processor can perform scalar multiplication 2.66 ms at 
255.66 MHz in on a Xilinx Kintex-7 devices. This design features to speed up the overall 
computation time. They applies the double-and-add algorithm to the design in a trade-off 
for speed. As stated previously, this design can be easily crack by SCA attacks. 
      
     A: Addition 
     D: Doubling    
 
 
     Power Trace 
          
     Secret Bit              0               1                    0                   1   
A 
D 
A 
D 
D D 
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4.2 Double-and-Add Always Algorithm 
In order to achieve more security strength against SPA, Coron proposed a double-and-add 
always algorithm in 1999 [7]. The main idea of this algorithm is to add a dummy operation 
to standard double-and-add to equalize the power consumption of each cycle. As illustrated 
in   Algorithm 4.3, a dummy addition is executed when the processing bit is zero. In this 
way, the algorithm is performing a doubling followed by an addition in every iteration. 
Since the algorithm is regular now, it has resistance to SPA attacks.  
Algorithm 4.3.Double-and-add always method 
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1, 𝑘0)2 ,𝑘𝑖𝜖 0,1 
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸 
Step 1: 𝑥 = 𝑂, 𝑦 = 𝑂; 
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜 
Step 3:     𝑥 = 2𝑥; 
Step 4:     𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑃; 
Step 5:    𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑦; 
Step 6:    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 7:𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Step 8:𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥 
 
However, another fault attack called c-safe error attack [9] can easily crack this 
algorithm. When the secret bit is zero, the addition result won’t affect the final result. When 
the attacker altered one bit of the secret key to zero, the result can be compared with the 
original output. If the result remains the same, the attacker knows that the secret bit is zero. 
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In the case the result changed, the attacker will figure that the secret bit is one and it is quite 
easy to locate. This algorithm is taking as an unsuccessful sequence mask example since 
the countermeasure takes to prevent SPA benefits other attacks [26]. 
Another attack threatening this algorithm is the doubling attack, which proposed by 
Fouque and Valette in [25]. The name is from the fact this attack is based on the doubling 
operation in the scalar multiplication. This type of attack only works when using left to 
right algorithms. To better explain it, consider two points 𝑃, 2𝑃 and secret 𝑘 =  9 =
(1001)2 as input. Double-and-add always method is used to compute 𝑘𝑃 and 𝑘 (2𝑃). As 
illustrated in Table 4.1, if we focus the doubling operation in each iteration, some of them 
shares the same pattern. To be more specific, doubling operation at iteration 2 calculat ing 
𝑘 (2𝑃) is the same as doubling operation at iteration 3 calculating 𝑘𝑃. Thus two zeros is 
overserved by the adversary. This attack reveals all the bits with the value zero and using 
these information, the whole secret bits can be revealed consequently. 
Table 4.1 Doubling attack against double-and-add always algorithm 
Iteration 𝑖  𝑘𝑖 𝑘𝑃 𝑘(2𝑃) 
3 1 2 ×  0 
0 +  𝑃 
2 ×  0 
0 +  2𝑃 
2 0 2 ×  𝑃 
2𝑃 +  𝑃 
2 ×  2𝑃 
4𝑃 +  2𝑃 
1 0 2 ×  2𝑃 
4𝑃 +  𝑃 
2 ×  4𝑃 
8𝑃 +  2𝑃 
0 1 2 ×  4𝑃 
8𝑃 +  𝑃 
2 ×  8𝑃 
16𝑃 +  2𝑃 
 
To the best knowledge, implementation for double-and-add always algorithm is 
very few since it is not efficiency compared to classical double-and-add. Although it has 
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more resistance to SPA, it is still vulnerable to many other attacks such like safe error  
attack. This method later stimulated development of more advanced algorithms such like 
MPL. 
4.3 Non Adjacent Form Method 
As stated in previous chapter, a point 𝑃 (𝑥,𝑦) on elliptic curve E over binary field, 
has additive inverse in the form – 𝑃 =  (𝑥, 𝑥 + 𝑦). Thus subtraction of point is actually the 
same as point addition on an elliptic curve. The non-adjacent form (NAF) is a signed digit 
representation [27] inspired by this fact. In NAF method, the secret key is represented by 
the following equation.  
 
𝑘 =∑ 𝑘𝑖2
𝑖
𝑙−1
𝑖=0
, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑘𝑖 ∈ {0, ±1}, 𝑘𝑙−1 ≠ 0 
In this expression, there is no two continuous nonzero digits. The advantage of this 
representation is that generally it has fewer nonzero bits [23], which leads to a reduction of 
addition operation needed in the algorithm. The NAF method is shown in Algorithm 4.4. 
  
Algorithm 4.4. Non Adjacent Form method 
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑁𝐴𝐹(𝑘) = ∑ 𝑘𝑖2
𝑖
𝑙−1
𝑖=0
, 𝑘𝑖𝜖 {0, ±1} 
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸 
Step 1: 𝑥 = 𝑃, 𝑦 = 𝑂; 
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=l−2 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜 
Step 3:     𝑥 = 2𝑥; 
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Step 4:    𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 +𝑃; 
Step 5:    else 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = −1,𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 + (−𝑃); 
Step 6:    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 7:𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Step 8:𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥 
 
The doubling attack mentioned in previous section still applies to the NAF method. 
Taking an integer 𝑘 =  29, and 𝑁𝐴𝐹 (𝑘) =  (1, 0,0 − 1, 0, 1) . Then if the adversary 
calculates 𝑘𝑃  and takes 𝑘 (2𝑃)  as a reference. From Table. 4.2, it is shown that the 
intermediate value at iteration i when computing 𝑘 (2𝑃) equals the result at iteration i-1 
when computing 𝑘𝑃 . All the secret bits with value zero is thus revealed. Since 
approximately two third of the bits in NAF representation is zero [28], most bits are 
retrieved applying doubling attack. 
Table 4.2 Doubling attack against NAF method 
Iteration 𝑖 𝑘𝑖 𝑘𝑃 𝑘(2𝑃) 
4 0 2 × 𝑃 2 × 2𝑃 
3 0 2 × 2𝑃 2 × 4𝑃 
2 −1 2 ×  4𝑃 
8𝑃 +  (−𝑃) 
2 ×  8𝑃 
16𝑃 +  (−2𝑃) 
1 0 2 × 7𝑃 2 × 14𝑃 
0 1 2 ×  14𝑃 
28𝑃 +  𝑃 
2 ×  28𝑃 
56𝑃 +  2𝑃 
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Wang introduced his implementation of an ECC coprocessor over  𝐺𝐹(2233) in 
2005 [29]. In this paper, a digit-serial multiplier which can achieve half or quarter clock 
cycles compared to the full-serial multiplier is proposed. With proper precomputation, this 
design can reduce the total calculating time by applying the projective coordinates. The 
coprocessor can perform a scalar multiplication in 2.28 ms at 80 MHz. However, the 
implementation algorithm chosen by the author is NAF method which vulnerable to attacks 
like doubling attack. 
4.4 Montgomery Powering Ladder Algorithm 
4.4.1 Explanation of Algorithm 
The Montgomery powering ladder is first proposed in [9] to provide a 
countermeasure to SPA. For a given 𝑘 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖2
𝑖𝑙−1
𝑖=0 , in order to compute 𝑘𝑃, the MPL is 
constructed based on the following relationships. Define 𝐿𝑗 = ∑ 𝑘𝑖2
𝑖𝑙−1
𝑖=𝑗  and 𝐻𝑗 = 𝐿𝑗 + 1. 
𝐿𝑗 and 𝐻𝑗can then be represented as 
{
𝐿𝑗 = 2𝐿𝑗+1 +𝑘𝑗 = 𝐿𝑗+1 +𝐻𝑗+1 + 𝑘𝑗 − 1.
𝐻𝑗 = 𝐿𝑗+1 +𝐻𝑗+1 + 𝑘𝑗
 
So at iteration 𝑗, it is easy to express 𝐿𝑗 and 𝐻𝑗 using the previous values from iteration 𝑗 +
1 
(𝐿𝑗, 𝐻𝑗) = {
(2𝐿𝑗+1, 𝐿𝑗+1 +𝐻𝑗+1) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑘𝑗 = 0 
(𝐿𝑗+1 + 𝐻𝑗+1, 2𝐻𝑗+1) 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑘𝑗 = 1
 
The above equations implies the structure of MPL. The calculations are very similar to 
each other and in each iteration one doubling is performed with one addition. Recall that 
the main computation of scalar multiplication is point doubling and point addition, the 
following algorithm is obtained.  
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Algorithm 4.5. Montgomery Powering Ladder 
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1, 𝑘0)2 ,𝑘𝑖𝜖 0,1 
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸 
Step 1: 𝑥 = 0, 𝑦 = 𝑃; 
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜 
Step 3:     𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑦 = 𝑥 + 𝑦;  𝑥 = 2𝑥 
Step 4:    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑥 = 𝑥 + 𝑦;𝑦 = 2𝑦 
Step 5:    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 6:𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Step 7:𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑥 
 
4.4.2 Advantage of MPL 
In algorithm 4.5, it is obvious that the computations for point addition and point 
doubling are independent. Thus they can be calculated parallel. This feature results in faster 
calculation speed. Moreover, since in every circle, MPL executes the same operation, it is 
considered highly regular. This structure makes it invulnerable to SPA.  
Another c safe-error attack introduced in previous section also has no effect to MPL. 
Unlike the double-and-add always algorithm, there is no dummy operation in MPL. So any 
fault injected will lead an error in the result.  
The doubling attack is considered ineffective. Assume there are two registers 𝑅0 
and 𝑅1 to store the intermediate values. It could be the value stored in 𝑅0 or 𝑅1 performs 
the doubling, depending on the secret bit. While the previous algorithms which are 
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vulnerable to doubling attack all shares the fixed doubling pattern, the attacker cannot see 
a repeated doubling operation when there is no continuous bits with the same value one or 
zero. But if there exists successive bits carrying the same value, the algorithm is vulnerab le 
to a relative doubling attack proposed in [30]. 
4.4.3 Relative Doubling Attack against MPL 
While the doubling attack mainly focus on finding the 0 bits, the relative doubling 
attack compares the value of two adjacent secret key bits. Let registers 𝑅0 store the value 
of 𝐿 𝑖, and registers 𝑅1 store the value of 𝐻𝑖. If 𝑘𝑖  =  𝑘𝑖−1  =  0, the following doubling 
computation is observed.  
{
𝑅0 ← 2× 𝐿 𝑖𝑃: 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 − 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑘𝑃
𝑅0 ← 𝐿 𝑖+1 × 2𝑃: 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑘(2𝑃)
 
Since 𝐿𝑖 = 2𝐿𝑖+1  when obviously the above equations are doing the same 
computation. Thus, if such collisions are observed, the attacker get the information  
𝑘𝑖  =  𝑘𝑖−1  =  0. 
Similar situation applies to when 𝑘𝑖  =  𝑘𝑖−1  =  1. Then in register 𝑅1, 
{
𝑅1 ← 2× 𝐻𝑖𝑃: 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 − 1 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑘𝑃
𝑅1 ← 𝐻𝑖+1 × 2𝑃: 𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑖 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑐𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑘(2𝑃)
 
same computations will be carried because that 𝐻𝑖 = 2𝐻𝑖+1. While when ki is not equal to 
𝑘𝑖−1 , there is no collision detected. 
Taking 𝑘 =  105 =  (1101001)2, the adversary computes 𝑘𝑃 and 𝑘(2𝑃) as the 
pattern shown in Table. 4.3. It is very clear that at iteration 1 and 2, collisions in register 
𝑅0 is detected. This fact leads to secret key bits 𝑘2  =  𝑘1  =  0. Taking iteration 5 and 6 as 
another example, the operations regarding values in register 𝑅1  is the same, thus the 
attacker figures 𝑘6  =  𝑘5  =  0. When there is no collision happened, that means the two 
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adjacent secret bits are holding different values. Then the whole secret key is revealed from 
the collision location bit by bit. 
                     Table 4.3 Relative doubling attack against MPL 
Iteration 𝑖  𝑘𝑖 𝑘𝑃 𝑘(2𝑃) 
6 1 𝑅0 = 0 +  𝑃  
𝑅1 = 2×  𝑃 
𝑅0 = 0 + 2𝑃  
𝑅1 = 2× 2𝑃 
5 1 𝑅0 = 𝑃 +  2𝑃  
𝑅1 = 2× 2𝑃 
𝑅0 = 2𝑃 +  4𝑃  
𝑅1 = 2× 4𝑃 
4 0 𝑅0 = 2× 3𝑃  
𝑅1 = 3𝑃+ 4𝑃 
𝑅0 = 2× 6𝑃  
𝑅1 = 6𝑃 + 8𝑃 
3 1 𝑅0 = 6𝑃 +  7𝑃  
𝑅1 = 2× 7𝑃 
𝑅0 = 12𝑃 +  14𝑃  
𝑅1 = 2 × 14𝑃 
2 0 𝑅0 = 2× 13𝑃  
𝑅1 = 13𝑃+ 14𝑃 
𝑅0 = 2× 26𝑃  
𝑅1 = 26𝑃 + 28𝑃 
1 0 𝑅0 = 2× 26𝑃  
𝑅1 = 26𝑃+ 27𝑃 
𝑅0 = 2× 52𝑃  
𝑅1 = 52𝑃 + 54𝑃 
0 1 𝑅0 = 52𝑃 +  53𝑃  
𝑅1 = 2× 53𝑃 
𝑅0 = 104𝑃 +  106𝑃   
𝑅1 = 2× 106𝑃 
 
4.4.4 M-safe Error Attack against MPL 
Despite the relative doubling attack, another fault attack M safe-error attack 
introduced in [19] is also proven to be effective against MPL. In this scheme, the fault 
induced by the attacker is temporary memory fault and it is very carefully timed. M safe-
error attack takes advantage of the two distinct operations carried out in each cycle of MPL. 
Consider the different computation when 𝑘 𝑖  is different. When 𝑘 𝑖 =  1 , the two 
operations are 𝑅0 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅1 and 𝑅1  = 2𝑅1. Any fault injected into 𝑅1 will change the 
value of the result, thus it is not a safe error. If 𝑘 𝑖 =  0, then 𝑅0 =  2𝑅0 and 𝑅1 =  𝑅0 +
 𝑅1 will be computed, error inputted into more significant bits of 𝑅1 will be erased after the 
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resigning of value in 𝑅1. In other words, the result still remains and the error is regarded a 
safe-error. The attacker can retrieve the secret bit 𝑘 𝑖 based on the above fact.  
4.4.5 Comparative Power Analysis against MPL 
Comparative Power Analysis is proposed by Homma in 2010 [31]. It is a more 
powerful attack which can compromise multiple scalar multiplication algorithms such like 
double-and-add algorithm, double-and-add always algorithm and MPL algorithm. While 
the original attack introduced is aiming at implementation of exponentiation, it also applies 
to scalar multiplication. 
Similar to the relative doubling attack, the basic idea of comparative power analysis 
is also generating collisions by inputting a pair of carefully chosen message. More 
specifically, the chosen inputs are set to satisfy the equation 𝛼𝑃 = 𝛽𝑄, where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are 
integer. The input 𝑃  is computed with the target operation 𝛼𝑃  while the input 𝑄  is 
illustrates the reference power trace. When the collision happens, the doubling operation 
of the two input will have very similar power trace. By comparison of the power traces, the 
target secret key bit is leaked. Unlike doubling attack, the collision can be retrieved from 
different time frames. 
Figure 4.2 shows an example how the attack scheme works. The input condition is 
chosen as 15𝑃 =  2𝑄. Consider the first four bits of the secret key is known to the attacker, 
the target bit is the fifth bit. The attacker then make an assumption that the target bit is 1, 
and illustrates the power traces. Then he examines the reference power traces at the time 
frame 2𝑄 doubling is computing,  if the power trace shares similarity with the target power 
trace at the time frame computing 15𝑃 doubling, the target secret bit is 1. The assumption 
made at the beginning is correct. If there is no similarity detected in the target and reference 
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power trace, the secret bit is 0. Note that the collision is generated at different timeframe 
of the two power traces. By repeating the attack pattern, all the bits of the secret key will 
be known. 
 
Figure 4.2 Comparative power analysis against MPL 
4.4.6 MPL based hardware implementation 
Deschamps and G.Sutter implemented EC scalar multiplication over 𝐺𝐹(2163) in 
2008 [32]. This design is implemented using MPL algorithm. The computation time is 1ms 
at 100MHz and a comparison with binary algorithm implementation has been made. As 
stated previously, implementation on unprotected MPL is still vulnerable to some SCAs, 
thus an implementation on a more secure algorithm is proposed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER V 
ANALYSIS OF MODIFIED MPL WITH COUNTERMEASURES 
In this chapter we introduce a modified MPL with sequence masking, exponent 
splitting and point randomization proposed in [11]. A small modification has been done to 
this algorithm to make it suitable for ECC scalar multiplication since it is origina l ly 
invented for exponentiation operation. 
5.1 Existing countermeasure techniques 
In previous Chapters, it has been stated that unprotected MPL is still vulnerable to 
a lot of side channel attacks. To offer protections in algorithm level, He, Huang and Wu 
proposed a highly secure MPL for exponentiation operation [11]. Several countermeasures 
had been applied to enhance its security strength.  
5.1.1 Coron’s three countermeasures to DPA 
Coron has proposed three countermeasures against DPA to improve the origina l 
MPL [7]. The first is to randomize the secret private exponent. The main idea is to change 
the representation of the secret exponent. Denote #ε as the number of all the points on the 
curve E, and select a random number k. Then the following computation is carried out to 
calculate 𝑑′ = 𝑑 + 𝑘#𝜀, the computation Q = dP is replaced by 𝑄 = 𝑑′𝑃. The correctness 
of this transform is based on the fact that #𝜀𝑃 = 0.  To expand this equation in detail, we 
get the following proof.  
𝑄 = 𝑑′𝑃 = (𝑑 + 𝑘. #𝜀)𝑃 = 𝑑𝑃 + 𝑘. #𝜀. 𝑃 = 𝑑𝑃 + 𝛰 = 𝑑𝑃 
The size of the random number k is suggested to be 20 for better security performance. By 
applying this countermeasure, the compute process is changed while the result 𝑄 still 
remains the same.  
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The second countermeasure is to blind the point 𝑃. Choose a random 𝑅 on the same 
curve as point 𝑃. Point 𝑅 is used as a mask to provide protection to the point 𝑃. Another 
point 𝑆  is computed as 𝑆 =  𝑑𝑅 . The cryptographic system then performs the scalar 
multiplication 𝑑(𝑅+ 𝑃). In order to retrieve 𝑄 =  𝑑𝑃, a subtraction will be applied the 
previous result. Since 𝑆 is already known, the final result will be recovered by 𝑑(𝑅+ 𝑃) −
𝑆. Point 𝑅 and 𝑆 will be updated in every initialization of the scalar multiplication. 
 The third countermeasure is to randomize to projective representation [33] of the 
point 𝑃 (𝑥,𝑦). Point 𝑃 can be represented in projective coordinates as (𝑋, 𝑌, 𝑍). Since it is 
not the only projective representation point P has, it can be written as (𝜆𝑋, 𝜆𝑌, 𝜆𝑍) where 
𝜆 ≠ 0. The binary representation of point 𝑃 is then guarded. Since this thesis mainly focus 
on implementation in affine coordinates, this countermeasure will not be discussed in detail.  
5.1.2 Exponent Splitting 
Exponent Splitting technique is first proposed in [34]. While it is used in 
exponentiation is the paper, the idea is the same in scalar multiplication. The basic thought 
is based on the simple observation that  
𝑑𝑃 =  (𝑑 − 𝑎)𝑃 +  𝑎𝑃 
 In this splitting technique, the scalar d can be split into two parts as the above 
equation indicated. First a random number 𝑟 is generated, where r is smaller than 𝑑. 𝑟’ is 
then calculated by 𝑟’ =  𝑑 − 𝑟. The scalar multiplication then become 
𝑑𝑃 =  𝑟𝑃 +  𝑟’𝑃 
since 𝑑 =  𝑟 +  𝑟’, it is obvious that the result is the same without scalar splitting. 
 Since we can see from the equation, the splitting technique is basically transforming 
a single scalar multiplication into two separate computations, thus it will be more time 
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consuming to put this technique into practice. Usually it takes two times the original time. 
But considering the security strength, sometimes the trade-off is worthy. This technique 
offers enhanced protection against SPA, and the randomization also helps to prevent some 
differential attacks.  
5.1.3 Blinded Fault Resistant Exponentiation 
This technique is first proposed by Fumaroli and Vigilant in [35]. It is an extension 
of Coron’s second countermeasure [7].  The main idea is to add a mask to the base point 𝑃 
to construct a masked MPL. The algorithm is originally for exponentiation operation, but 
by a small modification, it can be also applied to scalar multiplication. 
Algorithm 5.1. Masked Montgomery Powering Ladder 
Input: 𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1 , … , 𝑘1, 𝑘0)2 ,𝑘𝑖𝜖 0,1 
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸 
Step 1: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑅 𝑜𝑛 𝐸; 
Step 2: 𝑅0 = 𝑅, 𝑅1 = 𝑃 + 𝑅, 𝑅2 = −𝑅 
Step 3: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜 
Step 4:     𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅1 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅1; 𝑅0 = 2𝑅0; 𝑅2 = 2𝑅2 
Step 5:    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑘𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅0 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅1;𝑅1 = 2𝑅1; 𝑅2 = 2𝑅2 
Step 6:    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 7:𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Step 8:𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑄 = 𝑅0 + 𝑅2 
 
 In Algorithm 5.1, at the beginning of the operation, a random point 𝑅 is picked. 𝑅 
is acting as a mask to the base point 𝑃. Three registers 𝑅0 , 𝑅1 , 𝑅2  are needed for the 
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algorithm. 𝑅0 is initialised with the mask 𝑅, 𝑅1 is initialised with 𝑃 + 𝑅 and 𝑅2 is given 
the anti-mask –𝑅. The mask is updated at each iteration. The intimidate values in 𝑅0 and 
𝑅1 are blinded with the updated mask 2
𝑛−𝑖𝑅. The anti-mask value is also updated at every 
iteration. The value in register 𝑅2  is following the pattern 2
𝑛−𝑖(−𝑅). At the end of the 
computation, the final unmask step will be executed to recover the original desired result.   
 This algorithm can provide resistance to more attacks while still keeps the feature 
that regular MPL offers. Since the regular MPL is highly regular, the algorithm is 
insensitive to SPA. As the mask technique is applied in this algorithm, the intermed iate 
values are independent from the input and output according to [35]. Thus the attacker 
cannot exploited the secret key by DPA. Moreover, since any fault injected during any time 
of the computation will cause the change of the temporary result. The adversary cannot 
retrieve valuable information regarding the secret key bit. 
5.2 Security Analysis of Existing Countermeasure Techniques 
Although the techniques introduced in previous section are great improvement to 
the strength of existing algorithms.  They still face security challenge stand alone. 
5.2.1 High-Order Attack 
The high-order attack is first proposed by Muller and Valette in [36]. This attack is 
specifically derived from the statistical property of the exponent splitting. Although 𝑟 is a 
randomly selected number, the pair (𝑟,𝑟’) is not uniformly distributed since they satisfy 
𝑑 =  𝑟 +  𝑟’.  
 If the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ bits of 𝑟, 𝑟’ and 𝑑 is denoted as 𝑟𝑖  , 𝑟𝑖 ’ and 𝑑𝑖, 𝐶𝑖 representing the carry 
bit generated at the 𝑖 − 𝑡ℎ iteration. The following equation is satisfied. 
𝐶𝑖⨁𝑟𝑖⨁𝑟𝑖
′ = 𝑑𝑖 
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Let 𝑃𝑖 be the probability that the carry bit is zero, and 𝑃𝑟  is set to be the probability the pair 
(𝑟𝑖  , 𝑟𝑖 ’) be a certain value. In the case 𝑑𝑖 =  0 and 𝐶𝑖 =  0 , the probability for the pair 
(𝑟𝑖  , 𝑟𝑖 ’)  holds the value (0,0) or (1,1) is the same. When the value is (0,0), it is easy to 
get 𝐶𝑖+1 =  0. On the contrary, 𝐶𝑖+1 =  1. The same rules apply when 𝑑𝑖 =  1 . Table. 5.1 
shows the transition of the probability. The probabilities of iteration 𝑖 is generated from the 
previous iteration 𝑖 − 1. It is a Markov chain. 
 
Table 5.1 Probability transition when di = 0 or 1 
𝑃𝑟(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’) 𝑑𝑖 = 0 𝑑𝑖 = 1 
𝑃𝑟(0,0) 0.5 × 𝑃𝑖 0.5 × (1 − 𝑃𝑖) 
𝑃𝑟(0,1) 0.5 × (1 − 𝑃𝑖) 0.5 × 𝑃𝑖 
𝑃𝑟(1,0) 0.5 × (1 − 𝑃𝑖) 0.5 × 𝑃𝑖 
𝑃𝑟(1,1) 0.5 × 𝑃𝑖 0.5 × (1 − 𝑃𝑖) 
𝑃𝑖+1 0.5 × 𝑃𝑖 0.5 × (1 + 𝑃𝑖) 
 
 An example in [36] illustrates the idea of how this attack works. A secret 𝑑 with 
length 24 bits is chosen and the probability distribution of the pair (𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’) is computed in 
Table.5.2. The table shows whenever the secret bit d has a long run of 0s or 1s, it is very 
likely the randomly generated pair (𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’) hold different value. Taking the probability 
transition illustrated in Table.5.1 into account, the probability of 𝑃𝑖 can be calculated. In 
the case the secret bit is running long 0s (from 𝑑7 to 𝑑11  in the table), 𝑃𝑖 is approaching 0  
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Table 5.2 An example of bit-level imbalance [36] 
 𝑑0 𝑑1 𝑑2 …… 𝑑7 𝑑8 𝑑9 𝑑10  𝑑11  …… 𝑑18  𝑑19 𝑑20  𝑑21  𝑑22  𝑑23  
(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖’) 0 1 0 …… 0 0 0 0 0 …… 0 1 1 1 1 1 
𝑃𝑟(0,0) 50 25 38 …… 16 8 4 2 1 …… 8 47 23 11 5 2 
𝑃𝑟(1,0) 0 25 12 …… 34 41 46 48 49 …… 42 3 27 39 45 48 
𝑃𝑟(0,1) 0 25 13 …… 33 42 46 49 49 …… 43 4 28 40 46 49 
𝑃𝑟(1,1) 50 25 37 …… 17 9 4 1 1 …… 7 46 22 10 4 1 
 
indicating that there is no carry bit generated. While in the case of continuous 1s (from d19 
to d23  in the table), 𝑃𝑖 gets very close to 1, shows that the carry bit is propagating as the 
computation runs. If the attacker can launch an attack revealing the probabilities of the pair 
(𝑟𝑖 , 𝑟𝑖 ’), he can proceed to find information regarding the secret bit. The secret bit will no 
longer be secret.  
5.2.2 Template Attack 
Template attack [37] is based on the fact that power consumptions can be 
characterized by a multivariate normal distribution during the computations. Normally, it 
can be executed in two steps. The first step is to setup the templates and the second step is 
using the template to initialise attacks.  
 The multivariate normal distribution is defined by a covariance matrix C and a 
mean vector m. Where C holds the covariance of the targeting point and m is the mean of 
all the point on the trace. The pair (𝑚, 𝐶) is called the template. By sending in different 
data and key bit, a group of power trace is generated by the adversary. Until then, every 
data and key pair leads to a template. Then as stated above, in the second step, the attacker 
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compares the power trace from the target device with all the templates, and determine 
which one has the highest probability to be the correct template. After the correct template 
is recovered, the key is then retrieved. 
 Since in ECC scalar multiplication, the base point P is fixed. This observation offers 
template attack a great opportunity. In [38], Herbst and Medwed proposed a template attack 
scheme against masked MPL. In the scenario of scalar multiplication, the attacker set up 
the templates by running the scalar multiplication several times using different input data. 
The hamming weight of some intimidate values are also correlated. The power trace is then 
obtained to match with the template. In order to simplify the matching process, the first 
two multiplication of the base point are usually taken out to do the match. The template 
with highest matching probability indicates the first bit. The mask technique only blinds 
the point, but still by means of template attack, partial bits of secret k is recovered. The 
attacker can then focus on the masking operation to determine the mask 𝑅 . Since the 
hamming weight is known by the matching process. The mask 𝑅 will not be safe. 
5.3 Modified MPL with SM, ES and PR 
Since all the countermeasures listed in previous section is vulnerable to different 
attacks stand alone. He, Huang and Wu burrowed some of the ideas mentioned before and 
combined them to create a more secure algorithm [11].  
5.3.1 Algorithm Explanation 
 The new algorithm is illustrated as algorithm 5.2. The new algorithm is a 
combination of three ideas. The sequence masking technique [11], exponent splitting [34] 
and randomization of the message [35].  The combination of these three techniques greatly 
improved the security strength of the MPL. Further protections are provided to the 
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vulnerabilities stated in previous sections. 
 This algorithm works as follows, in the pre-computation phase, a random number 
𝑘0 smaller than secret bit k is generated. The secret bit 𝑘 is divided into two parts, the first 
part is the random number 𝑘0, the second part is calculated as 𝑘1 = 𝑘 − 𝑘0 . After that a 
random point 𝑅 on the same curve with point 𝑃 is generated. The point 𝑅 is acting as a 
mask, it is initialized to all the registers and the value is updated in each iteration. Another 
random number 𝑆 with the same bit size of secret key 𝑘 is generated afterwards. The 
introduction of random number 𝑆 is acting as a switch, it determines which computation to 
be executed. The original scalar multiplication is computed following each bit of 𝑘 
sequentially. With the random number 𝑆, it turns into a randomly computed process.  
Moving to the main iteration part of the algorithm, registers 𝑅0 and 𝑅1 holds the 
values related to the secret bit 𝑘0. While 𝑅2  and 𝑅3 store the values computed using 𝑘1. As 
introduced above, two scalar multiplications take turns to compute according to the current 
bit of 𝑆. When the main iteration part is finished, a final adjustment adding the values in 
𝑅0 and 𝑅2 is carried out to get the desired output.  
The following observations proved the correctness of the algorithm easily. Let 𝑖 
denotes the iteration number, the mask is updated following a pattern 2𝑖𝑅. The first scalar 
multiplication generates the intermediate value 2𝑖𝑅 + 𝑘0𝑃 , the second scalar 
multiplication holds that 2𝑖(−𝑅) + (𝑘 − 𝑘0)𝑃.  Adding them up, we get the value of 𝑘𝑃. 
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Algorithm 5.2. Modified MPL with SM, ES and PR 
Input:𝑃 𝜖 𝐸, 𝑘 = (𝑘𝑛−1,… , 𝑘1, 𝑘0)2 , 𝑘𝑖𝜖 0,1 
Output: 𝑄 = 𝑘𝑃 𝜖 𝐸 
Step 1: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 𝑅 𝑜𝑛 𝐸; 
Step 2: 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑘0 = (𝑘𝑛−1
(0)
…𝑘0
(0)
)2  𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝑘0𝜖 (1, 𝑘)  
               𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑘1 (𝑘𝑛−1
(1)
…𝑘0
(1)
)2 = 𝑘− 𝑘0 ; 
               𝑘0 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘1 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑛 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑠 
               𝐷0 = (𝑑𝑛−1
(0)
…𝑑0
(0)
)2 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐷1 = (𝑑𝑛−1
(1)
…𝑑0
(1)
)2  
Step 3:𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑡 𝑠𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 S = (𝑠𝑛−1,… , 𝑠1, 𝑠0)2 
Step 4: Set 𝑅0 = 𝑅,𝑅1 = 𝑃 +𝑅, 𝑅2 = −𝑅,𝑅2 = 𝑃+ (−𝑅) 
Step 5: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=𝑛−1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜 
Step 6:     𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛  
Step 7:       𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑛−1
(0)
= 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅1 = 𝑅0+ 𝑅1; 𝑅0 = 2𝑅0; 
Step 8:            𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  𝑅0 = 𝑅0+ 𝑅1; 𝑅1 = 2𝑅1; 
Step 9:       𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓; 𝐷0 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑏𝑦 1 𝑏𝑖𝑡.       
Step 10:  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑛−1
(1)
= 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅3 = 𝑅2+𝑅3;𝑅2 = 2𝑅2; 
Step 11:        𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑅2 = 𝑅2+ 𝑅3; 𝑅3 = 2𝑅3; 
Step 12:    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓; 𝐷1 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑏𝑦 1 𝑏𝑖𝑡.  
Step 13: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 14: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Step 15:𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 𝑛 − 1 𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛 𝑡𝑜 0 𝑑𝑜 
Step 16:     𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑖 = 1, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 
Step 17:       𝑖𝑓 𝑑𝑛−1
(0)
= 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅1 = 𝑅0 +𝑅1; 𝑅0 = 2𝑅0; 
Step 18:            𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒  𝑅0 = 𝑅0 +𝑅1; 𝑅1 = 2𝑅1; 
Step 19:       𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓; 𝐷0 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑏𝑦 1 𝑏𝑖𝑡.       
Step 20:  𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓𝑑𝑛−1
(1)
= 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑅3 = 𝑅2+𝑅3;𝑅2 = 2𝑅2; 
Step 21:        𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑅2 = 𝑅2+ 𝑅3; 𝑅3 = 2𝑅3; 
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Step 22:    𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓; 𝐷1 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡𝑠 𝑙𝑒𝑓𝑡 𝑏𝑦 1 𝑏𝑖𝑡.  
Step 23: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 24: 𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
Step 25:𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑅0 = 𝑅0+𝑅2 
 
5.3.2 Security Analysis 
As mentioned in previous sections, this algorithm provides enhanced protection to 
more attacks compared to existing algorithms. 
 Since algorithm 5.2 still holds the high regularity MPL offers, SPA is not effective 
against it. The main computation part always compute a doubling and an addition 
regardless the input bit. This it keeps all the resistance the regular MPL can provide. C-safe 
error attack is also eliminated because there is no dummy operation in this modified MPL.  
 Taking M-safe error into account. In M-safe error attack scheme, the induced 
memory fault need to be very carefully timed to determine whether it changed the result. 
Even if the attacker reveals a secret bit by a successfully inducing a safe error, the whole 
key pattern is not compromised since the key is divided into two parts. Moreover, the 
computation is executed in a random order. Thus M-safe error cannot threat the modified 
MPL. 
 Another attack mentioned above is the comparative power analysis, it also has little 
effect on the modified MPL with SM, ES and PR. This attack scheme is very similar to the 
relative doubling attack. Both the two attacks are trying to get two power traces and by 
comparing them to get valuable information of the secret key. Since the secret key is 
randomly divided into two parts in every initialization, the two power traces generated will 
follow different key pattern. It is very hard to make a meaningful comparison between 
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them. Even if a collision is observed, the mask applied to it in the precomputation will 
make the power trace totally different. An example listed below in Fig.5.1 will better 
explain the idea. The table above the power traces show the bits involved in the 
computation. The top row is the randomly generated sequence s, it is different in every 
initialization of the process. Below are the corresponding computation decided by sequence 
𝑠. Secret bit 𝑘0 will be processed when current bit of sequence 𝑠 holds 0. Otherwise, secret 
bit 𝑘1 will be computed. Only one of the two computations is carried out at the same time 
frame.  
 
Figure 5.1 Resistance of algorithm 5.2 to relative doubling attack 
 
 
44 
 
Taken the adjacent bits in the blue box as the first comparison bit, the computation 
involved is obviously different. But the adversary cannot easily say that the two bits are 
different since the two computations are carried out using different key 𝑘0 and 𝑘1, thus 
comparisons like this will become pointless, it provides no useful information regarding 
the secret bit. The second sample bits will be taken from the red boxes. Although the 
unmasked computations are all 2𝑃 → 4𝑃, the adversary will still observe different power 
traces since the mask is different as shown in Fig. 5.1. From above examples, the fact that 
comparison between adjacent bits cannot offer any useful information is easily obtained. 
Comparative power analysis shares similar scheme to relative doubling attack. It is also 
ineffective since Algorithm 5.2 breaks the hidden relationship it relies on. 
High-order attack is also worry free. When the attacker is trying to get enough 
samples to analysis the probability of the imbalance statistic property, the first thing he 
must do is to get access to the secret key. In the case of Algorithm 5.2, the secret key is 
randomly divided into two parts. The attacker need to know both parts to start collet 
samples and do the analysis, so high-order attack need to be combined with other attacks 
to be effective. As already stated above, SPAs are stopped by the property of highly regular. 
Relative doubling attack and comparative power analysis are of little use since every power 
trace generated are randomized by the random sequence s. Fault attack will also be stopped. 
Even though the attacker uses faults injected to one of the two scalar multiplications to 
make the two scalar multiplication distinguishable, it is hard for him to find a non-fault 
reference since all the intermediate values are masked. With above analysis, these attacks 
mentioned cannot threat Algorithm 5.2. That leaves the last one, template attack.  
By building Template attack can comparison the actual computation and the 
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template and in Section 5.2.2, we introduced how the mask 𝑅  will be compromised. 
Assume in Algorithm 5.2, the mask 𝑅 is known using template attack, then in order to 
reveal the secret key, the attacker need to get the intermediate values. In other words, he 
need to compute the updated mask 2𝑛−𝑖𝑅. For the two scalar multiplications, the iteration 
number 𝑖 is different. The iteration number is decided by the random sequence 𝑠, which 
doesn't participate in any computations. It only acts like a switch to decide which scalar 
multiplication to be computed. Thus even if the attacker retrieved the initial mask 𝑅, the 
updated mask is still a big challenge. Algorithm 5.2 will still be secure.  
With all the above analysis, we can see that Algorithm 5.2 is highly secure. It resists 
SCAs, relative doubling attack, comparative power analysis, high-order attack and 
template attack. It greatly enhanced the security strength of MPL from algorithm level. 
Thus it is chosen as the implementation algorithm. 
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CHAPTER VI 
PROPOSED HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION  
In this chapter, based on previous Algorithm 5.2, an efficient hardware architecture 
is proposed and its FPGA implementation is presented. Very high speed integrated circuit 
(VHSIC) Hardware Description Language is chosen as the target implementa t ion 
language. A modern Xilinx Virtex 7 (XC7VX690TFFG1926-3) field-programmable gate 
array (FPGA) device is used in the implementation. The ECC parameters are NIST-
recommended elliptic curve for 𝐺𝐹(2233) in [39], as shown in Table. 6.1, where 𝑓(𝑥) is 
the irreducible polynomial, n is the order, 𝐺𝑥  and 𝐺𝑦 are base point coordinates. 
NIST-recommended elliptic curve for GF(2233) 
Elliptic Curve 𝐸:𝑦2 +𝑥𝑦 = 𝑥3 +𝑎𝑥2 +1, 𝑎 = 0 
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥233 +𝑥74 +1 
𝑛 = 8000000000000000000000000000069𝑑5𝑏𝑏915𝑏𝑐𝑑46𝑒𝑓𝑏1𝑎𝑑5𝑓173𝑎𝑏𝑑𝑓 
G𝑥 = 17232𝑏𝑎853𝑎7𝑒731𝑎𝑓129𝑓22𝑓𝑓4149563𝑎419𝑐26𝑏𝑓50𝑎4𝑐9𝑑6𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑎𝑑6126 
G𝑦 = 1𝑑𝑏537𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑒819𝑏7𝑓70𝑓555𝑎67𝑐427𝑎8𝑐𝑑9𝑏𝑓18𝑎𝑒𝑏9𝑏56𝑒0𝑐11056𝑓𝑎𝑒6𝑎3 
 
Table 6.1 NIST-recommended parameters 
 
6.1 Implementation Hierarchy of the ECC operations 
The building blocks of computation involved in ECC is illustrated in Fig. 6.1. Finite 
field arithmetic such as field addition, subtraction, multiplication, inversion and squaring 
are the fundamental computations. Both elliptic curve point addition and doubling are 
based on the finite field computations. As the figure shown, the upper layer computations 
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are constructed by the lower layers. Scalar multiplication is realized by different algorithms 
based on point addition and doubling. Elliptic curve cryptographic schemes such like 
ECDSA are on the top. 
 
Figure 6.1 Hierarchical architecture for computation involved in ECC 
 
The main components of this ECC design are: field multiplication, field squaring, 
field inversion, group operations and random number generation. Recall that we introduced 
the polynomial basis in Section. 2.1. All implementation module in this chapter are using 
the polynomial basis representation.  
 
6.2 Random Number Generation 
In the pre-computation part, there three random binary sequence need to be 
generated. This process is implemented with a linear feedback shift register (LFSR). A 
LFSR is s sequential shift register with combinational logic that causes it to pseudo-
ECC
Algorithm
Scalar multiplication
Point addtion
Point doubling
Finite Field Arithmatic 
(addition,multiplication,inversion,squaring)
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randomly cycle through a sequence of binary values. It has well-known applications in 
generating pseudo-random binary sequence. A pseudo-random binary sequence is 
considered pseudo because it will start to repeat the pattern after a certain number of states. 
In order to make the generation more close to a real random number, the LFSR need to 
reach its maximum length. In other words, an n bit LFSR need to generate all 2n -1 states 
before it starts to repeat itself. By carefully chosen the positions of the bits feeding back to 
the next state, a maximum length LFSR can be achieved.  
For the case of the 233 bit random sequence, the tap value is 233 and 159 [40]. 
There are two structures of the LFSR. One is one-to-many structure (also known as Galois 
LFSR). The other is many-to-one structure (also known as Fibonacci LFSR). As Fig.6.2 
illustrated, a 233-bit Galois LFSR is built. This structure is chosen rather the many-to-one 
structure, is because that Galois LFSR generates all the feedback bits parallel. In this way, 
the LFSR runs more efficiently.  
Figure 6.2 233-bit LFSR 
The LFSR will generate three random sequence. The first random number will 
continue generating until it is smaller than order of base point P, then it is assigned to k0 
according to Algorithm 5.2. The second random sequence will generate and then assigned 
to s, acting as the switch to determine which scalar multiplication is going to perform. The 
third random sequence will be 𝑟, it will be used in the precomputation to compute 𝑟𝑃. Since 
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𝑟 is random, 𝑟𝑃 will be random point. The computation will need the modules introduced 
in later sections. 
6.3 Addition in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) 
Field addition is very easy to implement in VHDL. As stated in Section. 2.1, field 
addition is simply a bit-wise exclusive-or in either hardware or software. Subtraction in 
𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) is the same as addition in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚), since the additive inverse of an element is it-
self. All finite field addition is realized using simple x-or gate. 
6.4 Multiplication in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) 
The classical way to implement multiplication is the two-step computation. To 
perform a finite field multiplication, the first step is to do a multiplication and the second 
step is reduction. Pamula introduced another basic architecture in [41]. It is called the 
interleaved multiplication. In this method, the multiplication and reduction are interleaved. 
It is based on the following observation. Given two polynomials, 
𝑎(𝑥) = 𝑎𝑚−1𝑥
𝑚−1 + ⋯𝑎1𝑥 + 𝑎0  
𝑏(𝑥) = 𝑏𝑚−1𝑥
𝑚−1 +⋯ 𝑏1𝑥 + 𝑏0 
and define the irreducible polynomial  
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑚 + 𝑓𝑚−1𝑥
𝑚−1 + ⋯𝑓1𝑥 + 𝑓0  
the product will be given by  
𝑐(𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑥)𝑏(𝑥) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑥) ∑ 𝑏𝑖𝑥
𝑖
𝑚−1
0
𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑓(𝑥) 
𝑐(𝑥) = (𝑏0𝑎(𝑥)𝑥 + 𝑏1𝑎(𝑥)𝑥
2 +⋯+𝑏𝑚−1𝑎(𝑥)𝑥
𝑚−1)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑓(𝑥) 
𝑎(𝑥)𝑥 can be substituted by the following equation 
𝑎(𝑥)𝑥 = 𝑑 = 𝑎𝑚−1𝑥
𝑚 +⋯𝑎1𝑥
2 + 𝑎0𝑥 
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𝑑 = 𝑑𝑚−1𝑥
𝑚−1 + ⋯𝑑1𝑥 + 𝑑0  where {
𝑑0 = 𝑎𝑚−1𝑓0
𝑑𝑖 = 𝑎𝑖−1 + 𝑎𝑚−1𝑓𝑖
 
By applying these equations, the following structure is implemented. In the right 
part of Fig.6.3, a partial result interleaved with reduction is calculated.  The output is used 
as the input in next iteration and sent to the left to do the accumulation. The shift register 
holds the value of b and shifts right in every iteration. The left part accumulate the partial 
product in every iteration. And after m iterations, the result is computed.  
 
Figure 6.3 Multiplication unit 
6.5 Squaring in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) 
Polynomial basis squaring is relatively simple compared with multiplication. It is 
very similar to the classical two-step multiplication. The squaring operation can be done in 
two steps. The first step is to insert a 0 bit between consecutive bits of the binary 
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representation. The second step is also the polynomial reduction. In Fig.6.4, a pattern for 
squaring a polynomial 𝑎(𝑥) is shown. 
 Figure 6.4 Squaring a polynomial 
The reduction of it can however be achieved using a method called the reduction 
matrix [41]. The reduction matrix is constructed using the irreducible polynomial and can 
be computed when the operation starts. Since the polynomial representation of the squaring 
result before reduction is easy to get. Applying the reduction matrix method can greatly 
speed up the reduction process. 
6.6 Inversion in 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) 
Inversion is the most time consuming operation among all the implementa t ion 
module. There are serval existing method to do the field inversion over 𝐺𝐹(2𝑚) , the 
Fermat’s method and the extended Euclidean algorithm. While the Fermat’s method takes 
lots of time to calculate the value, here we choose the extended Euclidean algorithm [42]. 
Euclid’s algorithm is for calculating the greatest common divisor of two polynomials. The 
algorithm is extended to find two polynomials satisfying that  
gcd(𝑎(𝑥),𝑏(𝑥)) = 𝑢(𝑥) × 𝑎(𝑥) +𝑤(𝑥)× 𝑏(𝑥) 
If 𝑎(𝑥) is an element of the field defined by irreducible polynomial 𝑓(𝑥), we had 
the relation that gcd (𝑎(𝑥),𝑓(𝑥)) =  1. By replacing 𝑏(𝑥) with 𝑓(𝑥), the above equation 
is deduced to 1 =  𝑢(𝑥) × 𝑎(𝑥) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑓(𝑥). The inverse of 𝑎(𝑥) can then be calculated by  
𝑎(𝑥)−1 = 𝑢(𝑥) 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑓(𝑥) 
 
 
52 
 
Algorithm.6.1 illustrates how the inverse is calculated, the implementation is 
straight forward while the addition is done using x-or, division is done by right shift and 
multiplication is done by left shift. The result is outputted after 2m iterations. 
Algorithm 6.1. Extended Euclidean Method [42] 
Input: 𝑎(𝑥), 𝑓(𝑥) 
Output: 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑥)−1 
Step 1: 𝑙𝑒𝑡 𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑓(𝑥),𝑣(𝑥) = 0, 𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑎(𝑥),𝑢(𝑥) = 1, 𝑑 = 0; 
Step 2: 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖=0 𝑡𝑜 2m 𝑑𝑜 
Step 3:    𝑖𝑓 𝑟𝑚 = 0, 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑟(𝑥), 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑢(𝑥), 𝑑 = 𝑑 + 1 
Step 4:    𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑚 = 1, 
Step 5: 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑠(𝑥) − 𝑣(𝑥), 𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑣(𝑥) − 𝑢(𝑥) 
Step 6:𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 7: 𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑠(𝑥) 
Step 8: 𝑖𝑓 𝑑 = 0, 
Step 9: 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑟(𝑥) = 𝑠(𝑥),𝑠(𝑥) = 𝑟(𝑥) 
Step 10: 𝑢(𝑥) = 𝑥𝑣(𝑥),𝑣(𝑥) = 𝑢(𝑥) 
Step 11: 𝑑 = 1 
Step 12: 𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒 𝑢(𝑥) =
𝑢(𝑥)
𝑥
, 𝑑 = 𝑑 − 1 
Step 13:  𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 14:𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑓 
Step 15:𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑓𝑜𝑟 
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6.7 Elliptic Curve Group Operations in GF(2m) 
The group operations in ECC are the point addition and point doubling operations.  
As illustrated in Section 2.2, the group operations are implemented using the previous 
modules. Fig. 6.5 shows the block diagram of the point addition operation.  
Figure 6.5 Hardware architecture of point addition 
 It can be seen that as the equation in Section 2.2 shows, the point addition operation 
module requires two multiplications, one squaring and one inversion.  
 Similarly, Fig 6.6 shows the architecture of point doubling module. It requires two 
multiplications, two squaring and one inversion. The main computation part of Algorithm 
5.2 is building using these two modules, in the next section. We will discuss how the 
modified MPL with SM, ES and PR is realized. 
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Figure 6.6 Hardware architecture of point doubling 
6.8 Scalar Multiplication 
As the main computation of the ECC, Algorithm 5.2 provides a whole new MPL 
with strong resistance to SCAs. During the pre-computation process, the first scalar random 
sequence 𝑘0 is generated. The second scalar 𝑘1  is computed by 𝑘 − 𝑘0  .Another random 
sequence s is produced and finally the random point 𝑅 =  𝑟𝑃 is acting as the mask. 
There four registers 𝑅0 , 𝑅1 , 𝑅2  and 𝑅3  holding 4 different intermediate values. 
They are initialized by the 𝑥, 𝑦 coordinates of the base point 𝑃 and mask 𝑅. 𝑅0 and 𝑅1 are 
given the value 𝑅 and 𝑃+ 𝑅 at the beginning. 𝑅2 and 𝑅3 are initialized with – 𝑅 and 𝑃 −
𝑅 . The anti-mask –𝑅  shares the same 𝑥  coordinate with 𝑅 . While the 𝑦 coordinate is 
calculated simply x-or the coordinates of mask 𝑅. Three shift registers to store the value of 
𝑠, 𝑘0, and 𝑘1. The control unit is the core unit to realize the algorithm. The input and the 
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output of the point addition and point doubling module is controlled by this unit. The 
control unit has 36 different states to decide which value from which register to be given 
as the input of point operation module, also at the same time, the specific register to store 
the output is decided. The states are controlled by the three random values in the shift 
register. Additionally, a counter aiming for m cycles is built in as to tell the whole process 
when to stop the computation. Fig. 6.7 illustrates the blocking diagram of the top main 
computation module. 
Figure. 6.7 Architecture of proposed implementation  
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6.9 Synthesis Results 
The VHDL code is synthesized for Xilinx XC7VX690 using Vivado 2017. The 
hardware resource usage is summarized in Table. 6.2. The computation time at 100 MHz 
is 4.43 ms. We can see Algorithm 5.2 doubles the computation time needed since it consist 
of two scalar multiplication. Fig. 6.8 shows the result of the output waveform. 
Algorithm 
Number 
of FFs 
Number 
of LUTs 
Number 
of IOs 
Clock 
Cycles 
Regular MPL 8317 8753 708 220,020 
Algorithm 5.2 11247 11405 708 442,493 
 
Table 6.2 Hardware usage of different algorithms implemented 
 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Output waveform 
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The hardware implementation results and performance comparisons with some 
existing implementations are listed in Table. 6.3. It is to be noted that since the result 
provided in literature are implemented on different FPGA technologies from out design. 
Thus, a straight forward comparison is hard to make.  
 
 
Table 6.3 FPGA implementation complexity comparison between proposed design and 
related works 
From the table, it is clear that there are very few implementation done with 
countermeasures, the main concern for most of the designs listed are speed. [4, 26, 41 and 
43] adapted the projective coordinates to reduce the amount of inversion operation and 
improve the calculation speed. Scalar multiplications in [32] uses MPL without any 
Work Algorithm Device Field FFs LUTs f(MH
z) 
Time Cycles 
[32] MPL Spartan-3 GF(2
163
) 3265 130 1 ms n.a. 
[44] Binary XC4VLX8
0 
GF(2
163
) 24,263 143 n.a. n.a. 
[45] Binary XC2V6000 GF(2
233
) 16970 19,440 100 n.a n.a.  
[46] MPL XCV2000E
-7 
GF(2
233
) 10632 35,800 67.9 n.a  n.a. 
[47] Binary XCV2000E GF(2
233
) 15,478  
  
37 13.2 
ms 
n.a.  
[29] NAF XC3S1000 GF(2
233
) n.a.   n.a. 80 2.28 
ms 
183000 
[24] Binary XC7K325T GF(2
233
) 9407 9151 255.6
6 
2.66 
ms 
679776 
Proposed MPL XC7VX690 GF(2233) 8317 8753 100 2.2 ms 220020 
Proposed Modified 
MPL 
XC7VX690 GF(2
233
) 11252 10405 246.1 1.8 ms 442493 
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countermeasure. Implementations in [21, 41 and 42] uses binary method for scalar 
multiplication. All these mentioned references are applying the algorithms without any 
further protections. 
 
Table 6.4 Comparison of SCA countermeasure property between proposed work and 
existing related works 
Our proposed implementation on scalar multiplication is not as efficient as some of 
the listed design such like [4 and 26]. But our implementation mainly focus to provide a 
protected power trace to eliminate potential SCA threat. And the clock cycle is comparable 
to some listed design such like [24]. Table. 6.4 shows that our implementation can resist 
Algorithm/Implementation Doublin
g [8] 
Relative 
doubling [30] 
Comparativ
e power 
analysis 
[31] 
M-
safe 
error 
[19] 
C-
safe 
error 
[9] 
High-
order 
[36] 
Template 
attack 
[37] 
Binary [21,41,42,44] n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a 
NAF [29] × n.a × n.a n.a n.a n.a 
MPL [29,43] √ × × × √ n.a n.a 
Masked MPL [11] √ n.a √ √ n.a n.a × 
Exponent Splitting [11] √ n.a √ √ n.a × n.a 
Proposed √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
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most existing side channel attacks comparing with related implementations. Overall, our 
implementation can provide better protection against SCAs. 
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE FUTURE WORKS 
7.1 Discussion 
In this thesis, an efficient architecture for the scalar multiplication algorithm [11] 
is proposed. A FPGA implementation of the algorithm [11] is presented. It is the first time 
that this algorithm is implemented in hardware.  
This implementation resistant to most existing side channel attacks such as 
doubling attack [8], relative doubling attack [30], comparative power analysis [31], m-safe 
error attack [19], c-safe error attack [9], high-order [36] and template attack [37]. As shown 
in Table 6.4, compared to the existing related works, the proposed implementation offers 
the best countermeasures to SCAs. 
7.2 Possible Future Work 
As a pseudo-random number generator, LFSR is simple and fast but its output does 
not have the property of very good randomness. It follows a pattern that can repeat after a 
certain number of states. Those sequences of numbers are random-like in some aspects. If 
the attacker knows the seed and also the tap values, the randomness of the generated 
sequence maybe compromised. A better random generator such like mentioned in [43] can 
further protect the implementation.  
In addition, since our design is implemented using affine coordinates, projective 
coordinates [29] can be adopted in the design. The advantage of using projective 
coordinates is that the amount of finite field inversion operation can be greatly reduced 
with proper pre-computation. Finite field inversion operation is considered as the most time 
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consuming module in ECC scalar multiplication. So the computation time may be 
shortened if projective coordinate systems is adopted. 
Moreover, this design features a regular bit serial interleaved multiplier. Faster 
method for implementation such like digit level multiplier in [44] can be utilized to further 
speed up the elliptic curve scalar multiplication. 
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APPENDICES 
SELECTED VHDL PROGRAMMING CODES 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Top level: Introduces the point coordinates and k through the same port 
--Author: Che Chen 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all; 
use IEEE.std_logic_arith.all; 
use IEEE.std_logic_unsigned.all; 
 
package my_package is 
constant m: natural := 233; 
constant logm: natural := 8; 
constant zero: std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0) := (others => '0'); 
end my_package; 
 
library IEEE; 
use IEEE.std_logic_1164.all; 
use IEEE.std_logic_arith.all; 
use IEEE.std_logic_unsigned.all; 
use work.my_package.all; 
 
entity top_MaskedMont is 
port ( 
  inData: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0);   
--  xP_data, yP_data, k_data: in std_logic; 
  clk, reset, start: in std_logic; 
  outxQ, outyQ: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
--  xQ_or_yQ: in std_logic; 
  done: out std_logic 
  ); 
end top_MaskedMont; 
 
architecture circuit of top_MaskedMont is 
 
  component MaskedMont is 
  port ( 
    xP, yP, xR, yR, y_minus_R, x_pplusr, y_pplusr, x_pminusr, y_pminusr: in std_logic_vector(m-1 
downto 0); 
  k0, k1, s: in std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0); 
    clk, reset, start: in std_logic; 
    xQ, yQ: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
    done: out std_logic 
    ); 
  end component MaskedMont; 
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  component rand_gen is 
  Port (   clk : in  STD_LOGIC; 
     reset : in  STD_LOGIC; 
           start : in  STD_LOGIC; 
     K : in  std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0); 
           k1,s,k0,r : out  std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0); 
           done : out  STD_LOGIC); 
  end component rand_gen; 
   
  component EC_montgomery_multiplication is 
  port ( 
    xP, yP, k: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
    clk, reset, start: in std_logic; 
    xQ, yQ: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
    Q_infinity: inout std_logic; 
    done: out std_logic 
); 
end component EC_montgomery_multiplication; 
 
component Point_add_v2 is 
port( 
  x1,y1,x2,y2: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
  clk, reset, start: in std_logic; 
  x3: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
  y3: out std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
  done: out std_logic 
  ); 
end component Point_add_v2; 
 
  signal xP, yP, k0, k1, s, k, xQ, yQ, r, xR, yR, y_minus_R, x_pplusr, y_pplusr, x_pminusr, y_pminusr: 
std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0); 
   
  signal start_ran, start_main, ran_done, main_done, xP_data, yP_data, k_data, start_r_point, 
r_point_done,  
  start_add1, add_done1, start_add2, add_done2: std_logic; 
   
  subtype states is natural range 0 to 14; 
 
  signal current_state: states; 
 
begin 
 ran: rand_gen port map( 
                    clk, reset, start_ran,k, 
                    k1, s, k0, r, ran_done ); 
         
randomR: EC_montgomery_multiplication port map( 
                  xP, yP, r, 
        clk, reset, start_r_point, 
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        xR, yR, 
        done => r_point_done); 
         
        y_minus_R <= xR xor yR; 
         
P_plus_R: Point_add_v2 port map(xP, yP, xR, yR, clk, reset, start_add1, x_pplusr, y_pplusr, 
add_done1); 
P_minus_R: Point_add_v2 port map(xP, yP, xR, y_minus_R, clk, reset, start_add2, x_pminusr, 
y_pminusr, add_done2); 
         
 
MaskedMont port map( 
                    xP, yP, xR, yR, y_minus_R, x_pplusr, y_pplusr, x_pminusr, y_pminusr,k0, k1, s,  
                    clk, reset, start_main, 
                    xQ, yQ, main_done ); 
         
registers: process(clk) 
  begin 
  if clk' event and clk = '1' then  
    if xP_data = '1' then xP <= inData; end if; 
    if yP_data = '1' then yP <= inData; end if; 
    if k_data = '1'  then k <= inData; end if; 
  end if; 
  end process; 
 
control_unit: process(clk, reset, current_state) 
begin 
 
end process;  
 
  outxQ <= xQ; outyQ <= yQ; 
 
end circuit;  
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
-- Random number generator 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
entity rand_gen is 
    Port ( Clk : in  STD_LOGIC; 
     reset : in  STD_LOGIC; 
           start : in  STD_LOGIC; 
     K : in  std_logic_vector (232 downto 0); 
           k1,s,k0,r : out  std_logic_vector (232 downto 0); 
           done : out  STD_LOGIC); 
end rand_gen; 
 
architecture Behavioral of rand_gen is 
 
type state_type is (idle,s0,s1,s2); 
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signal state : state_type := idle; 
signal rand_out : unsigned(232 downto 0); 
 
component lfsr is 
port (clk,reset : in std_logic; 
      rand_out : out unsigned(232 downto 0)     
    ); 
end component; 
  
begin 
 
lfsr_inst : lfsr port map(Clk,'0',rand_out); --keep generating random numbers. 
  
process(Clk,reset) 
begin 
 if(reset = '1') then  
  state <= idle; 
  done <= '0'; 
 elsif(rising_edge(Clk)) then 
  case state is 
   when idle => 
    if(start = '1') then --start the fsm. 
     state <= s0; 
    end if; 
    done <= '0'; 
   when s0 => 
    if(rand_out < unsigned(K)) then --check if k0 is less than K 
     k0 <= std_logic_vector(rand_out); 
     k1 <= std_logic_vector(unsigned(K)-rand_out); --if yes, so 
the subtraction and assign it to k1. 
     state <= s1; 
    else 
     state <= s0; 
    end if;  
   when s1 =>  
    if(rand_out < unsigned(K)) then --check if k0 is less than K 
     r <= std_logic_vector(rand_out); 
     state <= s2; 
    else 
     state <= s1; 
    end if;  
   when s2 =>  
    s <= std_logic_vector(rand_out); --the next random number is 
assigned to s. 
    state <= idle;  
    done <= '1'; --done signal is asserted and goes back to idle state 
waiting for next start signal. 
  end case;   
 end if; 
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end process; 
 
end Behavioral;  
 
entity MaskedMont is 
port ( 
xP, yP, xR, yR, y_minus_R, x_pplusr, y_pplusr, x_pminusr, y_pminusr: in std_logic_vector(m-1 
downto 0); 
k0, k1, s: in std_logic_vector (m-1 downto 0); 
clk, reset, start: in std_logic; 
xQ, yQ: out std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
--Q_infinity: inout std_logic; 
done: out std_logic 
); 
end MaskedMont; 
 
architecture arch of MaskedMont is 
 
constant zero: std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0) := (others => '0'); 
 
component Point_add_v2 is 
port( 
  x1,y1,x2,y2: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
  clk, reset, start: in std_logic; 
  x3: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
  y3: out std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
  done: out std_logic 
  ); 
end component; 
 
component Point_double_v2 is 
port( 
  x1, y1: in std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
  clk, reset, start: in std_logic; 
  x3: inout std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
  y3: out std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
  done: out std_logic 
  ); 
end component; 
 
signal xR0, yR0, xR1, yR1, xR2, yR2, xR3, yR3, 
       next_xR0, next_yR0, next_xR1, next_yR1, next_xR2, next_yR2, next_xR3, next_yR3: 
std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
    
signal int_k0, int_k1, int_s: std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
 
signal add_in_x1, add_in_y1, add_in_x2, add_in_y2, dou_in_x, dou_in_y,  
       add_out_x, add_out_y, dou_out_x, dou_out_y: std_logic_vector(m-1 downto 0); 
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signal ce_R0, ce_R1, ce_R2, ce_R3, start_add, start_dou, add_done, dou_done, k_m_minus_1_0, 
k_m_minus_1_1, s_m_minus_1, 
       reset_counter, count_down, last_step: std_logic; 
 
signal step_number: std_logic_vector(logm-1 downto 0); 
 
signal sel_R0, sel_R1, sel_R2, sel_R3, sel_in_dou, sel_in_add: std_logic_vector(1 downto 0);  
 
subtype states is natural range 0 to 36; 
 
signal current_state: states; 
 
begin 
 
with sel_R0 select next_xR0 <= add_out_x when "01", dou_out_x when "10", xR when others; 
with sel_R0 select next_yR0 <= add_out_y when "01", dou_out_y when "10", yR when others;  
with sel_R1 select next_xR1 <= add_out_x when "01", dou_out_x when "10", x_pplusr when others;  
with sel_R1 select next_yR1 <= add_out_y when "01", dou_out_y when "10", y_pplusr when others; 
with sel_R2 select next_xR2 <= add_out_x when "01", dou_out_x when "10", xR when others;  
with sel_R2 select next_yR2 <= add_out_y when "01", dou_out_y when "10", y_minus_R when 
others; 
with sel_R3 select next_xR3 <= add_out_x when "01", dou_out_x when "10", x_pminusr when 
others; 
with sel_R3 select next_yR3 <= add_out_y when "01", dou_out_y when "10", y_pminusr when 
others; 
with sel_in_add select add_in_x1 <= xR0 when "00", xR2 when others; 
with sel_in_add select add_in_y1 <= yR0 when "00", yR2 when others; 
with sel_in_add select add_in_x2 <= xR1 when "00", xR0 when "11", xR3 when others; 
with sel_in_add select add_in_y2 <= yR1 when "00", yR0 when "11", yR3 when others;  
with sel_in_dou select dou_in_x <= xR0 when "00", xR1 when "01", xR2 when "10", xR3 when 
others;-- "11" 
with sel_in_dou select dou_in_y <= yR0 when "00", yR1 when "01", yR2 when "10", yR3 when 
others; 
 
register_R0: process(clk) 
begin 
if clk' event and clk = '1' then  
if ce_R0 = '1' then xR0 <= next_xR0; yR0 <= next_yR0; end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
 
register_R1: process(clk) 
begin 
if clk' event and clk = '1' then  
if ce_R1 = '1' then xR1 <= next_xR1; yR1 <= next_yR1; end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
 
register_R2: process(clk) 
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begin 
if clk' event and clk = '1' then  
if ce_R2 = '1' then xR2 <= next_xR2; yR2 <= next_yR2; end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
 
register_R3: process(clk) 
begin 
if clk' event and clk = '1' then  
if ce_R3 = '1' then xR3 <= next_xR3; yR3 <= next_yR3; end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
 
add: Point_add_v2 port map(add_in_x1, add_in_y1, add_in_x2, add_in_y2, clk, reset, start_add, 
add_out_x, add_out_y, add_done); 
 
double: Point_double_v2 port map(dou_in_x, dou_in_y, clk, reset, start_dou, dou_out_x, dou_out_y, 
dou_done); 
 
with step_number select last_step <= '1' when "00000000", '0' when others; 
 
shift_register_k0: process(clk) 
begin 
if clk'event and clk = '1' then 
if reset_counter = '1' then int_k0 <= k0; 
elsif count_down = '1' then 
for i in m-1 downto 1 loop int_k0(i) <= int_k0(i-1); end loop; 
int_k0(0) <= '0'; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
 
k_m_minus_1_0 <= int_k0(m-1); 
 
 
shift_register_k1: process(clk) 
begin 
if clk'event and clk = '1' then 
if reset_counter = '1' then int_k1 <= k1; 
elsif count_down = '1' then 
for i in m-1 downto 1 loop int_k1(i) <= int_k1(i-1); end loop; 
int_k1(0) <= '0'; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
 
k_m_minus_1_1 <= int_k1(m-1); 
 
shift_register_s: process(clk) 
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begin 
if clk'event and clk = '1' then 
if reset_counter = '1' then int_s <= s; 
elsif count_down = '1' then 
for i in m-1 downto 1 loop int_s(i) <= int_s(i-1); end loop; 
int_s(0) <= '0'; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
 
s_m_minus_1 <= int_s(m-1); 
 
 
output_xQ: process(clk, last_step) 
begin 
if clk' event and clk = '1' then  
if last_step = '1' then 
for i in 0 to m-1  loop 
    xQ(i) <= xR0(i); 
  yQ(i) <= yR0(i); 
end loop; 
end if; 
end if; 
end process; 
 
end process; 
end; 
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